



Security of Airport Transport Infrastructure in Europe

A new toolkit to boost airport security
Kelly Burke (NIS) June 25, 2020



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 832969.



1. Basic project information
2. Bringing the theory into practice
3. Challenges and issues

1. Basic project information

25/06/2020


1. Basic project information

2. Bringing the theory into practice


2

3. Challenges and issues

Project setup






18 partners, 10 nations
Total Costs: €9,890,595
Funding: €7,989,264
PM planned: 1058
Duration: 24 months
3 airport end-users★



Motivation 1/2

Land-side (Passenger Terminal)



Motivation 2/2

¹ACI Europe research 2015
²PwC survey 2015
³HP/Ponemon research 2014
⁴UK BIS 2015 survey


Costs of cyber-security breaches are high:

- €1M/hour for a disruption at a major European airport¹.
- €2M+ direct cost of a serious cyber-compromise².
- €250M in losses of European airport revenue for a six-day closure (estimate following Eyjafjallajokull eruption 2010¹).


It's important to take cyber-security seriously, especially as:

- 170 days = average time to detect a malicious or criminal attack³.
- 90% of large organisations reported suffering a security breach⁴.
- 75% of board directors are not involved in review of cyber-security risks².


Project Goal



Project structure



Objectives of SATIE - Part 1



Objectives of SATIE – Part 2



2. Bringing the theory into practice

Scenarios for simulation and demonstrations



Scenario	Description
Scenario 1	Cyber-physical attack targeting passengers' security (Athens airport)
Scenario 2	Disturbance of the passenger controls (Athens airport)
Scenario 3	Compromising of the Airport Operations Database (Milan airport)
Scenario 4	Disorganization of Baggage Handling Services (Zagreb airport)
Scenario 5	Endangered Air Traffic Management (simulation airport)

✓ As-is analysis of the airports and harmonization of security procedures

CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCESS IN AIRPORTS

SATIE

Preparedness

Response

Recovery

Preparedness

1. Develop Plans

Risk Assessment,
Incident Response,
Business Continuity,
etc.



1-6, 11



14, 16-25,
27, 28, 30

2. Organize and Equip

Define roles and
processes, acquire
and integrate
equipment, etc.



1-6, 11



14, 16-25,
27, 28, 30

3. Train and Exercise

Scenario Building,
Training processes
and teams, etc.



ALL



14, 16, 17, 18,
21-23, 25, 26,
28, 30

Response

7. Determine Plan

and activate relevant
response plan(s)



3, 7, 9

6. Incident Assessment

(critical / non-critical
and level of criticality)



3-6, 8, 10

5. Information Gathering

Incident Information
Gathering



4-6, 8, 10, 11

4. Incident Detection

Manual or automated



4-6, 8, 10, 11

Recovery

15. Share relative information

with internal
stakeholders



ALL

14. Create evidence report

for internal and ...



3, 7, 9, 11, 12

13. Collect and analyze

Collect and analyze



...

12. Recovery Actions

Take recovery actions



3-6

Mitigation

20. Take mitigation measures

(structural or non-structural)
based on the outcomes of an
incident assessment or an initial
risk/vulnerability assessment.



1-6, 11



20-25, 27, 28,
30

16. Share relative information

with external
stakeholders and
assist investigation



3, 7



15-19, 21-23,
25, 28



15, 21-23, 25,
28, 30



15, 21-23, 25,
28, 30






1-6, 11



14, 19-25, 27,
28, 30





Risk assessment performed for the airports of each scenario







Threat propagation model created for each scenario



©2020 Fraunhofer EMI




✓ Integration room available in Elancourt






Each system has been deployed on the CyberRange platform





Ontology and semantics of the system were defined




✓ Steps of the scenario (e.g. MITM attack) are being decided on

Step 3	Detail	Information
	Description	A cyber-attack on the SWIM services
	Feared event	Unavailability of SWIM services
	Attacker	APT group (criminal organization)
	Attacker's objective	To produce chaos and confusion
	Motivation	Money/terrorism
	Simulation	SWIM services need authentication, DoS new user request overload, bruteforce attack
	Attack path	1) DoS attack on an unpatched Linux machine with user authorization which is connected to the SWIM services (exploit a known OS vulnerability) 2) The attacker takes control of the computer
	Assets	One computer, SWIM services server, network infrastructure
	Impacts	Flight plans are unavailable; flights are cancelled, aircraft stay grounded
	Means of detection	Correlation Engine
	Incident response	The Air Traffic Management services team enters a new security level

✓ The platform verification & validation plan is being developed

Bespoke validation questions – based on each system (IE), both quantitative checks and qualitative questions will be tailored to determine the validity:

- Do you trust this system's results to be accurate and up-to-date?
- With what frequency (per minute) do you receive updates from this system?



General validation questions – both quantitative checks and qualitative questions about the SATIE solution:

- Is this solution **useful** and **acceptable**?
- Was it an acceptable length of time to receive an alert?
- Does the solution produce too many false positives?

Standard validation questionnaires – questionnaires which are already on the market in order to standardize and legitimize our approach:

- System Usability Scale (**usability, trustworthiness**)
- Trust questionnaire from Eurocontrol SHAPE project

3. Challenges and issues

Sensitive information

- Collecting necessary information from end-users to perform the risk assessment and threat propagation while abiding by all EU-restricted regulations (international and national)
- Meeting project needs with end-user operational needs:
 - Having real-time vulnerability detectors installed on airport systems
 - Performing accurate demonstration scenarios with shadow systems in the airports with access to sensitive data

Covid-19 Related Unavailability

- Decreased availability of end-users (airport closures)
- Unavailability of partner personnel to work (due to restricted working hours, forced vacation, etc.)
- Lack of physical access to some systems has prevented particular progress to be made
- Unreliability of teleconferencing (especially audio) has decreased the efficiency of the meetings



Further information and results can be found at <http://satie-h2020.eu/>

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 832969. This output reflects the views only of the author(s), and the European Union cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.